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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 890060-CA 
TERRY B. COGAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LINDA S. COGAN 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an Appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a), R. Utah Ct. 
App. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Defendant/Appellant can bring a Petition 
for Modification and/or Enforcement of a New Mexico Decree of 
Divorce filed in Utah pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
2. Whether Defendant/Appellant is entitled to an 
award to attorney's fees on appeal. 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THOUGHT 
TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES 
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann., Sections 
78-22a-l through 8 (1983). The specific language to be construed 
is found in Utah Code Ann., Section 78-22a-2 (1) and (2) as 
follows: 
(1) For purposes of this chapter, "foreign 
judgment" means any judgment, decree, or 
order of a court of the United States or of 
any other court whose acts are entitled to 
full faith and credit in this state. 
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenti-
cated in accordance with an appropriate act 
of Congress or an appropriate act of Utah may 
be filed with the county clerk of any county 
in Utah. The clerk of the district court 
shall treat the foreign judgment in all 
respects as a judgment of a district court of 
Utah. A judgment filed under this chapter 
has the same effect and is subject to the 
same procedures, defenses, and proceedings 
for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or 
staying, as a judgment of a district court of 
this state and is subject to enforcement and 
satisfaction in like manner. 
The Utah Long-Arm Statute, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-
27-24(6) (1987) relating to "divorce, separate maintenance, or 
child support" which provides: 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-
102, whether or not a citizen or resident of 
this state, who in person or through an agent 
does any of the following enumerated acts, 
submits himself, and if an individual, his 
personal representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as to any claim 
arising from: 
**** 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, 
separate maintenance, or child support, 
having resided, in the martial relationship, 
within this state notwithstanding subsequent 
departure from the state; or the commission 
in this state of the act giving rise to the 
claim, so long as that act is not a mere 
omission, failure to act, or occurrence over 
which the defendant had no control; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 13, 1988 Defendant filed an exemplified copy 
of a Final Decree of Dissolution entered in the 9th Judicial 
District, Roosevelt County, New Mexico with the Clerk of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County (R.2-5) Defendant 
also filed a Petition for Modification of this Decree (R.6-24) 
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and on October 28, 1988 Defendant served an Amended Petition for 
Modification on Plaintiff. (R.64-82) Defendant sought both 
modification and enforcement of the Decree. (R.6-24;64-82) 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the alterna-
tive a Motion to Quash (R.31-32) which was granted by the court. 
(R.61-63) This appeal was taken to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
(R.83) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 2, 1987 a Final Decree of Dissolution was 
entered in Case No. 86-DR161, 9th Judicial District Court, 
Roosevelt County, New Mexico between Plaintiff, appearing as 
Petitioner Pro Se, and Defendant, being without representation. 
(R.2-3) Defendant signed a waiver of appearance, settlement 
agreement and approved the Final Decree. (R.2-4) No reference 
was made to alimony in the Final Decree or proceedings there-
after. (R.2-4;ll-24) 
Defendant supported and maintained Plaintiff while he 
attended college from 1982-1986; Plaintiff graduated from college 
in December, 1986; commenced legal action for Dissolution on 
December 15, 1986; the court dissolved the marriage on January 2, 
1987; and thereafter Plaintiff passed the CPA examination and 
became a CPA with a firm in Roswell, New Mexico. (R.7,47,74) 
Defendant is now a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah where she resides with the two minor children of the 
parties, Ashley Brann Cogan, dob 12-19-81, and Chondra Michelle 
Cogan, dob 8-19-75. (R.6,11-12) Defendant is now a resident of 
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Chaves County, State of New Mexico. (R.45,47) 
The Final Decree entered January 2, 1987 provided for 
$300,00 per month as support money for the two minor children of 
the parties. (R.12) At the time of the entry of the Final 
Decree; (1) Defendant earned $1,410.00 per month, (2) Plaintiff 
was unemployed, (3) Chondra was in grade school, and (4) Ashley 
was not yet attending school. (R.7) 
By October 13, 1988, the following changes had taken 
place; (1) the Consumer Price Index had increased approximately 
7%, (2) Defendant's earnings decreased to $1,250.00 per month, 
(3) Plaintiff was a CPA earning a minimum of $3,000.00 per month, 
(4) Chondra was in middle school with additional financial needs, 
and (5) Ashley is now attending school with additional financial 
needs. 
Plaintiff was to pay the deductibles on the health and 
dental insurance for the minor children of the parties up to 
$200.00 per year and one-half of any medical or dental expense 
incurred by the said minor children not covered by insurance. 
(R.17,21) 
On October 13, 1988 Defendant filed an exemplified copy 
of the Final Decree of Dissolution with the Clerk of the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County (R.2-5) and a Petition for 
Modification. (R.6-24) Plaintiff was served in Roswell, New 
Mexico on October 19, 1988. (R.47,48) 
An affidavit was filed on October 13, 1988 setting 
forth the last known address of Plaintiff (judgment debtor) which 
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did not correctly identify the status of the parties and the 
Notice of Judgment sent pursuant thereto was incorrect. (R.27-30) 
A correct affidavit was filed on November 23, 1988 and a correct-
ly mailed Notice of Judgment was mailed to Plaintiff on said 
date. (R.45,46) 
An Amended Petition for Modification was served on 
Plaintiff on October 28, 1988 (R.64-69) which is identical to the 
original Petition with the exception of the addition of a request 
for "equitable restitution" as an alternative to alimony. 
(R.7,65;6-24;64-82) 
Defendant's Petition-Amended Petition for Modification 
seeks (1) an award of alimony or equitable restitution, (2) an 
increase in the child support for the minor children of the 
parties, (3) judgment for an income tax deficiency, (4) judgment 
for various insurance deductibles and one half of non-covered 
medical and dental expenses, and (5) attorney's fees and costs, 
(R.6-24;64-82) 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the alterna-
tive a Motion to Quash service on the grounds of lack of juris-
diction of subject matter and personal jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff. (R.31-33) 
The aforesaid Motions were argued before the Court and 
the Court ruled that Defendant's Petition-Amended Petition was 
not well taken as to the modification or enforcement of her 
rights under the New Mexico Decree of Divorce. (R.52-60) The 
Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. (R.61-62) 
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Defendant took this Appeal. (R.83) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's dismissal of Defendant's Petition-
Amended Petition presents a question of law which should be 
reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to said 
ruling. Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, 752 P. 2d 884, 
887 (Utah 1988). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff has been given notice of Defendant's claims 
against him and has had the opportunity to appear and defend 
against the said claims all of which comports with notions of 
fair play and substantial justice. 
Plaintiff has sufficient minimum contacts with the 
State of Utah including: (1) an ex-wife with an alimony claim, 
(2) an ex-wife being pursued by the IRS due to Plaintiff's 
negligence or error in preparing the 1985 income tax returns, (3) 
his two children are attending public school in the State of 
Utah, (4) he has failed to pay insurance deductibles and his 
share of non-covered medical and dental expense, (5) he is 
current in his payments of support money to Defendant, (6) he has 
extensive visitation rights with his children some of which 
presumably will be exercised in the State of Utah, (7) he has 
agreed to communicate with Defendant regarding the children's 
physical, emotional and mental health, and (8) he has agreed to 
pay transportation costs to and from the State of Utah in 
exercising visitation. 
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Defendant's claims for alimony or equitable restitu-
tion, increased child support, payment of the IRS assessment, 
judgment for the deductibles and non-covered medical and dental 
expense are causes of action arising out of Plaintiff's commis-
sion of acts in the State of Utah either directly or indirectly. 
A fair balancing of the equities and convenience of the 
parties, minor children of the parties and the State of Utah tips 
the scales of justice in favor of in personam jurisdiction 
requiring Plaintiff to make his defense to Defendant's claims in 
the State of Utah rather than have Defendant travel to New Mexico 
to assert these claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS SIGNIFICANT MINIMUM CONTACTS WITH THE 
STATE OF UTAH PROVIDING A FAIR AND REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE 
EXERCISE OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 
CONDUCT HIS DEFENSE IN THIS STATE. 
The Utah Long Arm Statue relating to "divorce...or 
child support," supra, provides that the service on a party be 
made pursuant to Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-27-25. Plaintiff was served in accordance 
with this Rule. (R.47,48) The Utah Long Arm Statute was raised 
and argued to the Court below. (R. 36,53,58) 
The Utah State Legislature declared the public policy 
behind the Long Arm Statute which is set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-27-22 as follows: 
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It is declared, as a matter of legisla-
tive determination, that the public interest 
demands the state provide its citizens with 
an effective means of redress against 
nonresident persons, who, through certain 
significant minimal contacts with this state, 
incur obligations to citizens entitled to the 
state's protection. This legislative action 
is deemed necessary because of technological 
progress which has substantially increased 
the flow of commerce between the several 
states resulting in increased interaction 
between persons of this state and persons of 
other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure 
maximum protection to citizens of this state, 
should be applied so as to assert jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants to the 
fullest extent permitted by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
This legislative mandate was vigorously applied by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown & 
Assoc., 618 P.2d 1004 (Utah 1980) where the Court ruled at 1006: 
Although early decisions concerning the 
scope of this legislation applied a restric-
tive interpretation, this Court's most recent 
decisions recognize the expansive grant of 
jurisdictional power which the legislation 
embodies. As we explained in Abbott G. M. 
Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft: 
Because our Legislature in 1969 declared 
in clear, specific and mandatory terms 
that the scope of that personal juris-
diction should be enlarged "to the 
fullest extent permitted by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment", this Court herein 
acknowledges that this state's jurisdic-
tional standard should not be more 
restrictive than those allowed by 
federal due process limitations. 
The Court in Mallory, supra, then analyzed the 
applicable constitutional principles announced in International 
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Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 
95 (1945) and Milliken v. Mever, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 
342, 343, 85 L.Ed. 378 (1940), and formulated the following test 
relating to long arm jurisdiction based on the minimum contact 
standard at 618 P.2d 1007: 
The resultant standard for determining a 
nonresident's amenability to the jurisdiction 
of the state courts is not whether the 
nonresident is 'present' in the state, but 
rather whether the nonresident has such 
contacts with the 'state of the forum as make 
it reasonable, in the context of our federal 
system of government, to require the (non-
resident) to defend the particular suit which 
is brought.' (Emphasis added.) This reason-
ableness standard, incorporating the require-
ments of fair play and substantial justice, 
looks to the quality and nature of the 
nonresident's contacts with the forum state. 
Therefore, the central concern of the inquiry 
into personal jurisdiction is the relation-
ship of the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation, to each other. 
The Court went on to state at 618 P. 2d 1008 that a 
defendant was amenable to suit in Utah: 
....if the quality and nature of the defen-
dant's activity is such that it is reasonable 
and fair to require him to conduct his 
defense in this state. 
**** 
Reduced to more practical terms, the 
remaining inquiry involved in ascertaining 
the restrictions presented by the require-
ments of fair play and substantial justice 
concerns; (1) Whether the cause of action 
arises out of or has a substantial connection 
with the activity; and (2) The balancing of 
the convenience of the parties and the 
interests of the State in assuming juris-
diction. 
Plaintiff has the following significant minimum 
contacts with the State of Utah: 
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1. Plaintiff obtained a pro se divorce from defendant 
who was unrepresented by counsel and no provisions were made for 
alimony in the initial or subsequent proceedings. Plaintiff 
could have raised and disposed of the issue of alimony in the New 
Mexico Court but failed to do so. 
One of the purposes of alimony is "...to prevent the 
spouse from becoming a public charge." Eames v. Eames, 73 5 P.2d 
395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) Thus, Defendant may avoid becoming 
a public charge to the State of Utah by being allowed her claim 
for alimony or equitable restitution. 
2. Plaintiff negligently and erroneously prepared the 
federal tax return for the parties in 1985 leading to the assess-
ment from the IRS against Defendant which she does not have the 
ability to pay and which Plaintiff has refused to pay thereby 
causing financial hardship to Defendant and the two minor 
children of the parties. (R.8) 
3. The two minor children of the parties, Ashley, age 
7, and Chondra, age 13, are residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
with defendant and are attending public schools. (R.2,3,7,8) 
4. Plaintiff is required to pay $200.00 per year on 
the deductibles on the health and dental insurance policies for 
the minor children of the parties and one-half of all non-covered 
expenses. Plaintiff is currently in arrears in the payment of 
the deductibles and non-covered medical and dental expenses in 
the sum of $403.60 which could seriously affect the continued 
health and dental care of the minor children, impose an addition-
- 10 -
al financial burden on Defendant and impact local health care 
providers. (R.9,10,17,21) 
5. Plaintiff has been paying the original support 
money for the minor children of the parties directly to Defendant 
and is current in the payments in that no claim for arrearages 
have been made. 
6. The original decree of divorce dated January 2, 
1987 provided that Plaintiff should receive "reasonable rights of 
visitation." (R.2,3) In a Stipulated Agreement filed and 
approved by the Court on November 24, 1987, Plaintiff was to 
receive greatly expanded visitation rights with the minor 
children of the parties including: every other weekend; four 
weeks in the summer; arrangements for Christmas, Easter/Spring 
Break, Thanksgiving, Father's Day, Mother's Day, and other 
matters relating to said visitation. (R.19,20,21) Plaintiff 
obviously cares a great deal for his children and it can reason-
ably be expected that he will visit them and be present in the 
State of Utah and additionally, be required to pay for their 
transportation from Salt Lake City to Roswell and any other 
transportation required in effectuating the said visitation. 
(R.20) 
?• The stipulated agreement dated November 24, 1987 
further provides: "4. The parties agreed to keep each other fully 
informed of the children's physical, emotional and mental 
health." (R.21) This could result in interstate communication 
initiated by Plaintiff to the State of Utah via telephone or 
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mails. 
It is submitted that these are significant minimum 
contacts that constitute the commission of acts in the State of 
Utah giving rise to Defendant's claims in her Petition-Amended 
Petition. The Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-
24 with the adoption H.B. No. 37, 47th Utah Legislature, Laws of 
Utah 1987, Chapter 35 wherein the Bill was: 
An Act relating to the Judicial Code; 
establishing long arm jurisdiction for 
collection of child support; and clarifying 
long arm provisions regarding divorce and 
separate maintenance actions. 
The amendment added child support to long arm jurisdic-
tion and provided: 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce 
[ and], separate maintenance, [-fche-majrnfcenanee 
in—this—9-tea-tee-- <©€—a--mafey±monial--^ omiei-l-e—ate 
the—ti«e—the—etaim-a*ose] or child support, 
having resided, in the marital relationship, 
within this state notwithstanding subsequent 
departure from the state; or the commission 
in this state of the act giving rise to the 
claim, so long as that act is not a mere 
omission, failure to act, or occurrence over 
which the defendant had no control; 
It is submitted that the acts of Plaintiff complained 
of by Defendant in her Petition-Amended Petition were acts of 
commission and within the ambit of the amended Long Arm Statute. 
If a party failed to pay support money or alimony or 
spousal support or other economic provisions or benefits of any 
kind, this could arguably be a "mere omission, failure to act," 
which certainly was not intended by the Legislature. In order 
for the Long Arm Statute to have any meaning or utility to a 
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party in need of child support, alimony, maintenance or other 
economic support, the last clause of Subsection (6) must be 
narrowly construed and placed in proper prospective. 
In the case of Johansen v. Johansen, 305 N.W.2d 383 
(S.D. 1981) the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a finding of 
jurisdiction over the non-resident Defendant based solely on the 
minor child's domicile in the State. The Court ruled that the 
father "has purposefully failed to support his minor child" 
residing in South Dakota; the cause of action for child support 
arose out of this purposeful act; and at 305 N.W.2d 387: 
Finally, the requirement of fair play 
and substantial justice militates against 
denial of jurisdiction...Public policy 
demands that this child receive its inherent 
right of support. Moreover, denial of 
jurisdiction would place an onerous burden 
upon appellee. She would be required, at 
great expense and inconvenience, to return to 
Minnesota or proceed to Wyoming to seek 
support for this child. Were it not for the 
public policy requiring support of the child, 
this might be a very close question; however, 
the presence of such public policy, which the 
legislature recognized as sufficient to 
support jurisdiction in SDCL 15-7-2(7), tips 
the scales of fair play and substantial 
justice decidedly in favor of sustaining 
jurisdiction. 
The case of Hazen and Henderson, 702 P. 2d 1143 (Or. 
App. 1985) is also in point. Both parties had moved from the 
state of the matrimonial domicile with the custodial parent, 
mother, and child residing in Oregon and the non-custodial 
parent, father, residing in Ohio. The mother and child had no 
contacts with Ohio and the Oregon Court found jurisdiction based 
on (1) his payment of support money, (2) his communication with 
the mother about visitation, and (3) he had visited the child in 
Oregon, 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon ruled as follows at 702 
P.2d 1147: 
Oregon has a substantial interest in 
facilitating child-support actions on behalf 
of its resident children• Further, the 
interests of mother and the child in proceed-
ing with this cause in Oregon must be 
considered. (Citing Case) 
We conclude that the quality and nature 
of father's activity in Oregon are such that 
it is reasonable to require him to conduct 
his defense here. International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 317, 66 
S.Ct. at 158. "[T]he relationship among 
[father], the forum, and the litigation," 
Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, 433 US at 204, 97 
S.Ct. at 2580, is such that Oregon is a 
"fair" forum in this case. The maintenance 
of this matter in Oregon does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice. 
The Oregon Court distinguished on a factual basis the 
case of Kulko v. California Superior Court, 346 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 
1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978). The Kulko case is also distinguish-
able from the instant case in that the only point of contact the 
custodial father, a New York resident, had with California was 
that he allowed his children to move to California to live with 
their mother. Six Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
there were not sufficient minimum contacts to support the 
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the father and the 
ruling of the California Supreme Court finding jurisdiction 
existed was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
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Three Justices dissented and the dissent stated at 34 6 
U.S. 102: 
I cannot say that the Court's determina-
tion against state-court in personam juris-
diction is implausible, but, though the issue 
is close, my independent weighing of the 
facts leads me to conclude, in agreement with 
the analysis and determination of the 
California Supreme Court, that appellant's 
connection with the State of California was 
not too attenuated, under the standards of 
reasonableness and fairness implicit in the 
Due Process Clause, to require him to conduct 
his defense in the California courts. 
It should be further noted that the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-22a-l et seq. was adopted 
by the Legislature in 1983 from the Uniform Act which is entitled 
"Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act." (Emphasis Added) 
In the recent case of Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P. 2d 791 
(Utah 1988) a dubious foreign judgment was docketed pursuant to 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act and rather than refusing to enforce 
the judgment on the usual constitutional grounds for Defendant's 
lack of minimum contacts with the rendering state and dismissing 
the action, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's 
Order setting aside the foreign judgment thereby opening the case 
for further litigation of the non-resident Plaintiff's claim in 
the forum state. The Court ruled at 763 P.2d 795: 
A foreign judgment filed in this 
jurisdiction is treated in all respects like 
a judgment of the district court of Utah and 
is therefore subject to being vacated and set 
aside in a like manner. It was therefore 
appropriate for the district court to vacate 
and set aside the Mississippi judgment. 
It is submitted that the Legislative enactment of the 
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Uniform Act without the word "Enforcement" and the ruling of the 
Utah Supreme Court in Bradford v. Nacrle, supra, give addition 
meaning to key language of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act when it 
states in Utah Code Ann. 78-22a-2(2): 
A judgment filed under this chapter has 
the same effect and is subject to the same 
procedures, defenses, and proceedings for 
reopening, vacating, setting aside, or 
staying, as a judgment of a district court of 
this state and is subject to enforcement and 
satisfaction in like manner. 
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act contemplates cases such 
as Defendant's Petition-Amended Petition being brought against 
defaulting non-resident parties and should be considered in 
"balancing the convenience of the parties and the interests of 
the State in assuming jurisdiction." Mailory, supra. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
Based on the comparative financial condition and 
ability to pay Plaintiff and Defendant, (R.7-10) Defendant should 
be awarded attorney's fees on appeal. Utah Code Ann. Sections 
30-3-3 and 5. Stuber v. Stuber. 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 
(1952). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has sufficient minimum contacts with the 
State of Utah which do not offend traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice and violate the Due Process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant's claims arise out of 
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Plaintiff's commission of acts in the State of Utah either 
directly or indirectly. A fair balancing of the equities and 
convenience of the parties, the minor children of the parties and 
the State of Utah tips the scales in favor of a finding of in 
personam jurisdiction. Defendant is entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Wendell P. Abies 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of May, 1989, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Randall J. Holmgren, Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 50 West Broadway, 9th Floor, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101. 
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536 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Randall J. Holmgren 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
50 West Broadway, 9th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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CJ/S ^ ^ IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT & 
^ p IN AND FOR SALT. LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY B. COGAN, 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
Case No. 
Judge *V*«>* p . \)>J% \ \ ^ . I h ^ ^ ^ l 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA S. COGAN, 
Defendant• 
Linda S. Cogan, Defendant herein, hereby petitions the 
Court for a Modification of the Decree of Divorce entered herein 
on January 2, 1987 as follows: 
1.. She is the Defendant in the above action and 
resides in Salt Lake County, State of Utah together with the two 
minor children of Plaintiff and Defendant, Ashley Brann Cogan and 
Chondra Michelle Cogan. 
2. The Decree of Divorce was entered by and between 
Plaintiff and Defendant in the Ninth Judicial District Court, 
State of New Mexico, County of Roosevelt on January 2, 1987, Case 
No. 86DR161, an exemplified copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
3. Said Exhibit "A" has been filed with the clerk of 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and has the 
status as set forth in U.C.A., Section 78-22a-l et seq. and is in 
all respects the same as a Utah Judgment or Decree. 
4. There is no provision in respect to alimony in 
Exhibit "A" and Defendant is entitled to an alimony award in the 
sum of $2 0,000.00 based on her support and maintenance of 
Plaintiff while he attended college from 1982-1986; when he was 
awarded a degree in December, 1986; contemporaneously therewith 
divorced Defendant; passed the CPA Examination and became a CPA 
approximately six months thereafter. 
5. At the time of the entry of Exhibit "A" and Order 
of support money for the two minor children of the parties was 
entered in the sum of $300.00 per month for both children which 
was based on the following factors: 
A* Defendant's earnings of $1,410.00 per month. 
B. Plaintiff's unemployment. 
C. Chondra being in grade school. 
D. Ashley not yet attending school. 
6- Defendant alleges that the following substantial 
and material changes of circumstances have occurred since the 
entry of Exhibit "A:" 
A. The Consumer Prize Index has increased by 
approximately 7%. 
B. Defendant's earnings have decreased to 
$1,250.00 per month. 
C. Plaintiff is now a CPA with a large firm in 
Roswell, New Mexico and upon information and belief earns a 
minimum of $3,000.00 per month. 
2 
D. Chondra is now attending middle school and has 
additional financial needs. 
E. Ashley is now attending school and has 
additional financial needs. 
7. Exhibit "A" should be modified by increasing the 
support money from $300.00 per month for both children to $300 
per month per child or a total of $600.00 per month until the 
said children reach their 21st birthday. 
8. Plaintiff prepared all of the income tax returns 
for the parties during the course of the marriage based on his 
expertise in filing tax returns; his ongoing school in accounting 
and business oriented courses; his decree and potential CPA 
status; and Defendant's total lack of expertise and in fact 
naivety in filing tax returns. 
9. The joint tax returns for the parties prepared by 
Plaintiff and filed with the IRS for the tax year ending December 
31, 1985 was negligently and erroneously prepared leading to an 
assessment from the IRS when Defendant does not have the ability 
to pay the same and when Plaintiff has ample funds with which to 
pay the said indebtedness in the sum of $457.14 together with any 
future penalties and interest. 
10. Paragraph 5A of the "Settlement Agreement" a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated 
herein by reference, made part of Exhibit "A", provides that 
Plaintiff service the community indebtedness and that the amount 
owed to the IRS is a community indebtedness. 
3 
11. Paragraph 1 of Exhibit "B" and paragraph 2A of a 
"Stipulated Agreement and Order Proving Stipulated Agreement" 
dated November 24, 1987, copies of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference, provides that 
Defendant will maintain medical and dental insurance and Plain-
tiff shall pay $200.00 per child per year for deductibles if 
required and one-half of any sums not covered by the health or 
dental insurance. 
12. Since January 1, 1988 Defendant has maintained 
medical and dental insurance on the minor children of the parties 
with a $2 00.00 per year deductible for each and so far Ashley has 
incurred medical expense in the sum of $145.34 and Chondra has 
incurred medical expense in the sum of $316.63. Plaintiff owes 
Defendant $145.34 for Ashley and $258.32 for Chondra and has 
willfully refused to pay the same. 
13. Defendant has been required to retain the services 
of an attorney to obtain the modification of the Decree of 
Divorce entered herein and Plaintiff should be required to pay to 
Defendant, for the use and benefit of her attorney, a reasonable 
attorney's fee and costs. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for Judgment against 
Plaintiff as follows: 
1. That she be given an alimony award in the sum of 
$20,000.00. 
2. That support money be increased to $300.00 per 
month per child until the children reach 21 years of age. 
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3. Judgment in the sum of $457.10 for income tax 
deficiency for 1985. 
4. Judgment in the sum of $403.60 for deductibles and 
one-half of non-covered expenses. 
5. A reasonable attorney's fee and costs. 
6. Such other relief or modification the court deems 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
Dated this 1 ^ ^ day of October, 1988. 
'^j^fi^oQjl 
Wendell P. Abies 
Attorney for Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Linda S. Cogan, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says as follows: that she is the Defendant herein and has read 
the foregoing Petition for Modification; and that all of the 
allegations contained therein are true to her own knowledge and 
belief except as to those matters alleged upon information and 
belief and as to those matters, she believes the same to be true. 
Dated this day of October, 198i 
October 
'MS J. V: 
da S. Cogan/ 
and sworn to before me this _JJ2^» day of 
Notary Public 
Defendant's Address: 
8843 South Alpen Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO 
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT 
TERRY B. COGAN, ) 
PETITIONER PRO 3E, ) 
V. ) 
LINDA S. COGAN, ) 
RESPONDENT. ) 
FINAL DECREE 
THIS NATTER HAVING COME ON BEFORE THE COURT OH THE 
PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE FILED HEREIN, AMD THE 
PETITIONER HAVING APPEARED PRO SE AND THE RESPONDENT HAVING 
APPEARED NOT; HOWEVER, IT FURTHER APPEARING FROM THE RECORD 
THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS SIGNED A WAIVER OF APPEARANCE AND 
HAS ENTERED INTO A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND HAS APPROVED THIS 
FINAL DECREE, AND THE COURT BEING FULLY ADVISED IN THE 
PREMISES FINDS: 
1. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OF THE PARTIES HERETO 
AND OF THE SUBJECT MATTER HEREIN. 
2. THAT THE PARTIES ARE IRRECONCILABLY INCOMPATIBLE 
AND THE COURT SHALL GRANT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE OF 
THE PARTIES. 
3. THAT THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS FAIR AND JUST AND SHALL BE APPROVED BY 
THIS COURT. 
4. THAT RESPONDENT SHALL HAVE THE CARE, CUSTODY AND 
CONTROL OF THE MINOR CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES, NAMELY, ASHLEY 
PPAMKI r:r>!-,A!-l. RORM DECEMBER .19, 19!;:j , AMD ClfUNDRA MICHELLE 
9TH JUOICIAL DISTRICT 
ROOSEVELT COUNTY. N.M. 
FILED IN MY OFFICE 
'87 JfiN 2 API 10 34 
CLERK. DISTRICT COURT 
HO. MJ&AI 
COGAN, BORN AUGUST-19, 1975, WITH PETITIONER HAVING REASONABLE 
RIGHTS OF VISITATION. 
5. THAT PETITIONER SHALL PAY AS AND FOR CHILD SUPPORT 
OF THE MINOR CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES THE SUM OF $300.00 PER MONTH 
UNTIL ASHLEY BRANN COGAN REACHES 18 YEARS OF AGE, BECOMES 
EMANCIPATED OR UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT, WITH SUCH 
CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 1987, DUE AND 
PAYABLE ON THE FIRST DAY OF EACH MONTH THEREAFTER. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUSTED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. THE PETITIONER SHALL. BE AMD HEREBY IS AWARDED A 
DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES AND THE PETITIONER AND 
RESPONDENT SHALL BE AMD HEREBY ARE•RESTORED TO THE STATUS OF 
SINGLE PERSONS. 
2. THAT RESPONDENT SHALL BE AND HEREBY 13 AWARDED THE 
CARE, CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN, 
ASHLEY BRANN COGAN, BORN DECEMBER: 19, 1981 AND CHONDRA MIGHEI.LE 
COGAN, BORN AUGUST 19\ 1975, AND THAT PETITIONER SHALL BE AND 
HEREBY IS AWARDED REASONABLE RIGHTS OF VISITATION THEREOF. 
3. THAT PETITIONER SHALL BE, AND HEREBY IS, ORDERED 
TO PAY SUPPORT FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE PARTIES'S MINOR CHILDREN 
IN THE AMOUNT OF $300.00 PER MONTH, PAYABLE UNTIL ASHLEY BRANN 
COGAN REACHES 18 YEARS OF AGE, BECOMES EMANCIPATED OR UNTIL 
FURTHER ORDER OF THIS COURT; AND THAT RESPONDENT SHALL BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE MINOR CHILDREN ON HER HEALTH 
AND DENTAL INSURANCE PLAN, WITH ALL AMOUNTS NOT COVERED, 
INCLUDING DEDUCTIBLES, TO BE SPLIT BETWEEN THE PARTIES EQUALLY. 
4. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE 
PARTIES ON FILE HEREIN SHALL BE, AND HEREBY IS, APPROVED IN 
ALL RESPECTS AND RATIFIED BY THIS COURT. SUCH SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT SHALL BE INCORPORATED HEREIN AS IF FULLY SET FORTH 
IN THIS DECREE, AND THE PROVISIONS OF SUCH SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
SHALL BE AS ORDERS OF THIS COURT. 
mNm
 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO 
NO. 86-DR-161 
CERTIFICATE OF EXEMPLIFICATION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ) ss. 
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT ) 
I, Delores Gentry
 f clerk of the District Court within and for the 
County of Roosevelt » do hereby certify that (3) 
foregoing pages of typewritten matter constitute a true, correct and complete 
exemplification of the original Final Decree 
filed and entered in the case of TERRY B. OOGflN 
Plaintiff and T.TNDA S. frrew Defendant, as the 
same remains on file and record in my office. 
8 6—DR—161 I further certify that the Number of said Cause is No. on the docket 
of said County. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and Seal of said Court this 
12th day of September
 f 1 9 88 ^ 
,„
 % A/OGDIOA, JhiTLqs 
(SEAL) CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Revised 1/1/83 CV 2.35 
UNITED STATE OF AMERICA 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO 
County of ROOSEVELT 
) 
) ss. 
) 
I, Fred T. Hensley Judge of the 9th Judicial District, Division J I . 
State of New Mexico, do hereby certify that Delores Gentry by whom the above 
attestation was made, was, at the date thereof Clerk of said Court, duly qualified and 
that the said attestation is in due form of law and made by the proper officer. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and Seal of said Court this 
12th day of September , 19 88 . 
(SEAL) DISTRICT JUDGE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
STATE OF AMERICA 
County of ROOSEVELT 
) 
) ss. 
I, Delores Gentry , Clerk of the District Court of the 9th Judicial 
District State of New Mexico within and for the County of Roosevelt
 t do 
hereby certify that the Honorable FRED T. HENSLEY by whom the above 
certificate was given and whose name is hereby subscribed, in his own proper handwriting, 
was at the date thereof, Judge of the 9th Judicial District of the State of New Mexico 
and Judge of the District Court within and for the County of Roosevelt duly 
commissioned, sworn and acting. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and Seal of said Court this 12th 
day of September 
.,19 88 
(SEAL) 
AtiPmo^ Jb?*rfc„ 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT/COURT JvCC 
Revised 1/1/83 CV 2.35 
IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO 
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT 
TERRY B. COGAN, 
PETITIONER, PRO SE, 
V. 
LINDA S. COGAN, 
RESPONDENT. 
NO. 
'
86
 ° K i s nn
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-ERK. DISTRICT COURT 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT IS ENTERED INTO THIS _/£!_ DAY OF 
&£CEM/5S&_ , 198&, BY AND BETWEEN TERRY B. COGAN, 
PETITIONER PRO SE, AND LINDA S- COGAN, RESPONDENT. 
W I T N E S S E T H 
WHEREAS, THE PARTIES ARE HUSBAND AND WIFE AMD THE 
PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE HAVING BEEN FILED ON 
THE _ZS1__ DAY OF £ZCEW_3££_ , l*8e.. 
WHEREAS, THE PARTIES DESIRE TO ENTER UPON AND SETTLE 
THE yUESriON OF CHILD CUSTODY, VISITATION AND SUPPORT AND 
THE DIVISION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND ALLOCATION OF COMMUNITY 
INDEBTEDNESS ON AN AMICABLE BASIS. 
IT IS THEREFORE UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED: 
1. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT RESPONDENT SHALL HAVE THE 
SOLE CARE, CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE PARTIES MINOR CHILDREN, 
ASHLEY BRANN COGAN, BORN DECEMBER 19, 1981, AND CHONDRA MICHELLE 
COGAN, BORN AUGUST 1*, 1*75, WITH REASONABLE RIGHTS OF VISITATION 
ON THE PART OF PETITIONER. PETITIONER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR A 
ON THE FIRST OF THE MONTH, BEGINNING ON JANUARY 1, 1987, UNTIL 
ASHLEY BRANN COGAN REACHES 18 YEARS OF AGE, BECOMES EMANCIPATED 
OB UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT. RESPONDENT SHALL MAINTAIN 
THE MINOR CHILDREN ON HER HEALTH AND DENTAL INSURANCE; HOWEVER, 
ANY SUMS INCLUDING DEDUCTIBLES NOT PAID BY SAID INSURANCE SHALL 
BE SPLIT BY'PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT. 
2. PETITIONER SHALL RECEIVE AS HIS SOLE AND SEPARATE 
PROPERTY THE FOLLOWING: 
A. 1<»84 KELMART GT AUTOMOBILE; 
B. ONE-HALF OF ALL HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS; 
C. ALL HIS PERSONAL BELONGINGS. 
3. RESPONDENT SHALL RECEIVE A3 HER SOLE AND SEPARATE 
PROPERTY THE FOLLOWING: 
A. 198fo PONTIAC GRAND AM AUTOMOBILE; 
B. ONE-HALF OF ALL HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS; 
C. ALL HER PERSONAL BELONGINGS. 
4. THE PARTIES OWN A HOME LOCATED AT 1011 W. WALNUT IN 
ROSWELL, CHAVES COUNTY, NEW MEXICO. RESPONDENT SHALL OCCUPY THIS 
RESIDENCE AND AT SUCH TIME AS THE HOME IS PUT ON THE MARKET FOR 
SALE, PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SHALL SPLIT THE PROCEEDS THEREOF 
EQUALLY. ALL REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE ON SAID HOME LOCATED AT 
1011 W. WALNUT SHALL BE SPLIT EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
5. THE PARTIES HAVE ALLOCATED THEIR CUMMUNITY INDEBTED-
NESS AS FOLLOWS: 
A. RESPONDENT HAS PAID PETITIONER HER PORTION 
OF THE COMMUNITY INDEBTEDNESS OWED DURING THE COURSE OF THEIR 
MARRJAUE BY SECUIUNG A LOAN WHICH SUM WAS TURNED OVER TO 
PETITIONER. RESPONDENT SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR THE 
PAYMENT 01 SAID LOAN. PETITIONFR SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR 
6. EACH PARTY SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS OR HER 
OWN RESPECTIVE BILLS AND DEBTS INCURRED ON OR AFTER THE DATE 
OF THE FILING OF THIS ACTION. 
7. EACH OF THE PARTIES HERETO AGREE TO EXECUTE ALL 
DOCUMENTS, DEEDS, OR AGREEMENTS OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER WHICH 
MAY BE NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT. 
i 
8. THIS AGEEEMENT IS IN ALL THINGS SUBJECT TO THE 
APPROVAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND IT SHALL BECOME A PART OF THE 
JUDGMENT GRANTING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE BONDS OF MATRIMONY IN 
THIS MATTER. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE PARTIES HAVE HEREUNDER SET THEIR 
HANDS THE DATE AND YEAR FIRST ABOVE WRITTEN. 
PETITIONED 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ) 
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT )SS. 
THE FOREGOING WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BEFORE ME THIS _V?Hr-
DAY OF _.Sfccft*^ **!., 1986, BY TERRY B. COGAN, PETITIONER PRO SE. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
_r__y^v*£> 
.^ ."'aiA'TJI "'OF NEW MEXICO 
/V'^OUMTY OF ROOSEVELT 
N0d2^Y PUBLIC 
iai). 
. . ^  T.HE FOREGOING WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BEFORE ME THIS <^_ 
*j.fi\?&~QF;£&t&at — -•• -
V*-... .-•••> ,* 
c/ *> ,•• 
1986, BY LINDA S. COGAN., RESP 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
N* COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
C/ahf-j&UQlg-
• * » * • ,< \ o 
• t ' re.*-. .:* S r ' 
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO 
TERRY B. COGAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LINDA S. COGAN, 
Respondent. 
STIPULATED AGREEMENT 
The parties seeking to settle between themselves the 
issue of child visitation, custody, and support, have made this 
compromised agreement as to their rights and obligations, and 
request the Court to approve this Stipulated Agreement. 
The parties stipulate and agree: 
1. Child Custody and Visitation: 
The Respondent, Linda S. Cogan, shall have the primary 
custody, care, and control of the parties' minor children, 
Chondra Michelle Cogan and Ashley Brann Cogan. 
The Petitioner, Terry B. Cogan, shall have minimum 
visitation rights as follows: 
A. Weekends: Every other weekend from 6:00 P.M. 
Friday to 6:00 P.M. Sunday. 
B. Summers: The Petitioner shall have four weeks 
9THJUDIC/AL DISTRICT 
ROOSEVELT COUNTY f u 
FUEO IK i^ OFFICE 
'87N0U2H AH n 40 
2i£flK.DJSTRJCT-C0Uar 
NO. DR-86-161 
visitation with the parties' minor children each summer, to be 
exercised in one four-week period or two two-week periods* The 
Petitioner shall give the Respondent 30 days notice of the time 
he will exercise the summer visitation* The visitation shall 
commence no sooner than the first day following the last school 
day of the spring term, and the visitation shall end no later 
than two weeks prior to the commencement of the fall term* 
C* Holidays: 
i» Christmas: One-half of the Christmas/New 
Tear's school holiday each year ending at noon on Christmas day 
in even-numbered years and beginning at noon on Christmas in odd-
numbered years* 
ii* Easter/Spring Break: All of the 
Easter/Spring Break from school in odd-numbered years*, 
iii. Thanksgiving: Thanksgiving Thursday and 
Friday in odd-numbered years* 
iv* Father's Day: Each Father's Day without 
regard to which alternating weekend in which it falls* 
v* Mother's Day: The Respondent shall have 
physical custody each Mother's Day without regard to which 
alternating weekend in which it falls. 
D* The cost of transportation to effect any 
visitation shall be paid by the Petitioner. 
E. Failure to exercise visitation shall not be 
construed as a waiver of future visitation rights* 
F. The Petitioner. Terry B. Cogan shall enjoy 
such other reasonable visitation as the parties may agree upon 
2 
from time to time* 
2* Child supportt 
A* The Respondent, Linda S. Cogan, will maintain 
health insurance on the parties' minor children* The Petitioner 
will pay any deductible amounts up to $200*00 per year if 
required* It is expressly understood that the insurance 
deductible amount could be less than the maximum amount set 
forth* 
3* The parties agree that each will refrain from 
directly or indirectly interfering with, or hindering, in any 
manner whatsoever the parent-child relationships of the parties 
and the children* Each party further agrees to monitor the 
children's contact with others to ensure that other persons do 
not, and are not allowed to, interfere with, or hinder, in any 
manner whatsoever the parent-child relationships of the children 
and the parties. Each party further agrees to positively 
reinforce and foster the children's relationship with the other 
party. 
4. The parties agree to keep each other fully informed 
of the children's physical, emotional and jnental health. 
5. Each party when having physical custody of the 
children shall not refuse the other party reasonable contact with 
the children, including but not limited to phone calls at 
reasonable hours and correspondence* 
6. Future Effect: 
The p a r t i e s agree t h a t t h i s Agreement s h a l l be 
incorporated into a st ipulated order modifying the Final Decree 
3 
filed in this cause, and shall be in full force and effect 
according to its own terms, whether incorporated by reference or 
fully Bet forth in the Court records. 
Terry M. Cogan 
Petitioner 
Thomas E« Lilley 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Li 
ResDondent 
J.^ETsetr 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
 9 T M mri,Mll 
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT Dnnct ° AL D,ST«*CT 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO "UOSEVELT COUNTY, H M 
nLEDIKifyorrV 
TERRY B- COGAN, 
87 DEC 21 fin 1 1 1 7 
Petitioner, x ' 
vs. K$¥%k<m~4&zfe 
LINDA S. COGAN, CLER*> DISTRICT COURT 
Respondents 
QRPER ftPPFOVINg STIPULATES ftgRESMENT 
This matter having come before the court upon 
Petitioner's motion for Specific Visitation and for Force 
Sale of Community Residence, and Petitioner appearing with 
his attorney, Thomas E. Lilley, and Respondent appearing 
with her attorney, A* J. Olsen, and the court being advised 
that the parties have entered into an agreement addressing 
the issue of custody, support, and visitation, and the court 
being well and otherwise fully advised in the premises 
f i nds: 
1. The Stipulated Agreement filed herein on the 3iQ- J~j. 
day of "Y^^iJLi^^vil^ 1987 is fair and reasonable and 
should be approved• 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the 
Stipulated Agreement on file herein shall be, and hereby is, 
approved and such agreement shall be, and hereby is, adopted 
herein as if fully set forth as orders of this court* 
Fred Hensley 
District Court Judge 
Submitted: 
7 ^ - ^  ^ ; 
Thomas E. Li 1 ley ^ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
sen 
At torffey-f or-Respondent 
F
'LEO»NGLSRK.SOJrncE 
^a» Lake County uteh 
Wende l l P . A b i e s , Bar No. 11 \**~\ NOV 2«? tQOo 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t /*\*/ &*J$m 
536 East 400 South C^j^^fcindiey 0^3^,n 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102 fir^*^ ^ 7 * « ° P'« Court 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 532-7424 Oeputy^fe, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY B. COGAN, I
 ;, y 
mif ^•'m THIRTY (30) DAY 
Plaintiff, jlrf M : SUMMONS 
vs. : Case No. b~o*-^ IPO^Y P~5"" 
LINDA S. COGAN, : 
: Judge Uav>t» f-.lul\^ lvj:a^  
Defendant. : 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer 
in writing to the attached Petition for Modification with the 
Clerk of the above-entitled Court, and to serve upon, or mail to 
Wendell P. Abies, Defendant's attorney, 536 East 400 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, a copy of said Answer, within thirty (30) 
days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, Judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Petition for 
Modification, which has been filed with the Clerk of said court 
and a copy of which is hereto attached and herewith served upon 
you. 
Serve Plaintiff Terry Cogan: c/o of Deason, Peters, 
Stockton and Company, Certified Public Accountants, 400 
North Pennsylvania Avenue, Roswell, New Mexico. 
Dated this Y^ day of October, 1988. 
Wendell P. Abies 
Attorney for Defendant 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ) 
_ COUNTY) 
RETURN FOR COMPLETION BY SHERIFF OR DEPUTY: OCTOBER 1 9 , 1988 
I certify that I served the within Summons in said County on the ' ^ day of 
, 19 (j \ j
 T by delivering a copy thereof, with copy of Complaint 
attached, and a form for Answer, in the following manner: 
RETURN FOR COMPLETION BY OTHER PERSON MAKING SERVICE: 
I, being duly sworn, on oath, say that I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this lawsuit, and 
that I served the within Summons in said County on the day of 
., 19 , by delivering a copy thereof, with copy of Complaint attached, 
and a form for Answer, in the following manner: 
(checjijQffe box and fill in appropriate blanks) 
-ZJ To Defendant. (Used when Defendant receives 
copy of Summons or refuses to receive Summons.) 
• To • , a person over 15 years of age and residing at the 
usual place of abode of Defendant , who 
at the time of such service was absent therefrom. 
D By posting a copy of the Summons and Complaint in the most public part of the premises of Defendant 
. (Used if no person found at dwelling 
house or usual place of abode.) 
• To , an agent authorized to receive service of 
process for Defendant . 
• To , 
Name of person Title of person authorized to receive service 
. (Used when Defendant is a corporation or association subject to a suit under a 
common name, a land grant board of trustees, the State of New Mexico or any political subdivision.) 
Fees^ 
Signature of private citizen 
making service 
s/ltfM* SHFRIFFOF L fX^nJ^S. COUNTY Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
State of New Mexico 
»y /J ^4^4 Dale 
Deputy 
Judge, notary or other officer 
authorized to administer oaths 
White-ftetum of Service Copy Yellow—Service Copy *w—uctirtrNei*jpj$ 
HLEODfSTlHCT COURT 
Third Judicial District Wendell P. Abies, Bar No. 11 
Attorney for Defendant 
536 East 400 South JAN I 3 1989 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COJ#£f ^ " ¥D*uty<afck 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY B. COGAN, 
AMENDED 
Plaintiff, : PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
vs. 
LINDA S. COGAN, 
Defendant. 
Linda S. Cogan, Defendant herein, hereby petitions the 
Court for a Modification of the Decree of Divorce entered herein 
on January 2, 1987 as follows: 
1. She is the Defendant in the above action and 
resides in Salt Lake County, State of Utah together with the two 
minor children of Plaintiff and Defendant, Ashley Brann Cogan and 
Chondra Michelle Cogan. 
2. The Decree of Divorce was entered by and between 
Plaintiff and Defendant in the Ninth Judicial District Court, 
State of New Mexico, County of Roosevelt on January 2, 1987, Case 
No. 86DR161, an exemplified copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
3. Said Exhibit "A" has been filed with the clerk of 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and has the 
status as set forth in U.C.A., Section 78-22a-l et seq. and is in 
all respects the same as a Utah Judgment or Decree. 
4. There is no provision in respect to alimony in 
Exhibit "A" and Defendant is entitled to an award of alimony or 
equitable restitution in the sum of $50,000.00 based on her 
support and maintenance of Plaintiff while he attended college 
from 1982-1986; when he was awarded a degree in December, 1986; 
contemporaneously therewith divorced Defendant; passed the CPA 
Examination and became a CPA approximately six months thereafter. 
5. At the time of the entry of Exhibit "A" and Order 
of support money for the two minor children of the parties was 
entered in the sum of $300.00 per month for both children which 
was based on the following factors: 
A. Defendant's earnings of $1,410.00 per month. 
B. Plaintiff's unemployment. 
C. Chondra being in grade school. 
D. Ashley not yet attending school. 
6. Defendant alleges that the following substantial 
and material changes of circumstances have occurred since the 
entry of Exhibit "A:" 
A. The Consumer Prize Index has increased by 
approximately 7%. 
B. Defendant's earnings have decreased to 
$1,250.00 per month. 
C. Plaintiff is now a CPA with a large firm in 
Roswell, New Mexico and upon information and belief earns a 
minimum of $3,000.00 per month. 
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D. Chondra is now attending middle school and has 
additional financial needs. 
E. Ashley is now attending school and has 
additional financial needs. 
7. Exhibit "A" should be modified by increasing the 
support money from $300.00 per month for both children to $300 
per month per child or a total of $600.00 per month until the 
said children reach their 21st birthday. 
8- Plaintiff prepared all of the income tax returns 
for the parties during the course of the marriage based on his 
expertise in filing tax returns; his ongoing school in accounting 
and business oriented courses; his decree and potential CPA 
status; and Defendant's total lack of expertise and in fact 
naivety in filing tax returns. 
9. The joint tax returns for the parties prepared by 
Plaintiff and filed with the IRS for the tax year ending December 
31, 1985 was negligently and erroneously prepared leading to an 
assessment from the IRS when Defendant does not have the ability 
to pay the same and when Plaintiff has ample funds with which to 
pay the said indebtedness in the sum of $457.14 together with any 
future penalties and interest. 
10. Paragraph 5A of the "Settlement Agreement" a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated 
herein by reference, made part of Exhibit "A", provides that 
Plaintiff service the community indebtedness and that the amount 
owed to the IRS is a community indebtedness. 
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11. Paragraph 1 of Exhibit "B" and paragraph 2A of a 
"Stipulated Agreement and Order Proving Stipulated Agreement" 
dated November 24, 1987, copies of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference, provides that 
Defendant will maintain medical and dental insurance and Plain-
tiff shall pay $200.00 per child per year for deductibles if 
required and one-half of any sums not covered by the health or 
dental insurance. 
12. Since January 1, 1988 Defendant has maintained 
medical and dental insurance on the minor children of the parties 
with a $200.00 per year deductible for each and so far Ashley has 
incurred medical expense in the sum of $145.34 and Chondra has 
incurred medical expense in the sum of $316.63. Plaintiff owes 
Defendant $14 5.34 for Ashley and $258.32 for Chondra and has 
willfully refused to pay the same. 
13. Defendant has been required to retain the services 
of an attorney to obtain the modification of the Decree of 
Divorce entered herein and Plaintiff should be required to pay to 
Defendant, for the use and benefit of her attorney, a reasonable 
attorney's fee and costs. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for Judgment against 
Plaintiff as follows: 
1. That she be given an award of alimony or equitable 
restitution in the sum of $50,000.00. 
2. That support money be increased to $300.00 per 
month per child until the children reach 21 years of age. 
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3. Judgment in the sum of $457.10 for income tax 
deficiency for 1985. 
4. Judgment in the sum of $403.60 for deductibles and 
one-half of non-covered expenses. 
5. A reasonable attorney's fee and costs. 
6. Such other relief or modification the court deems 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
Dated this ^ S ^ day of October, 1988. 
Wendell P. Abies 
Attorney for Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Linda S. Cogan, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says as follows: that she is the Defendant herein and has read 
the foregoing Amended Petition for Modification; and that all of 
the allegations contained therein are true to her own knowledge 
and belief except as to those matters alleged upon information 
and belief and as to those matters, she believes the same to be 
true. 
Dated this 2^5 day of October, 1988. 
Defendant's Address: 
8843 South Alpen Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
PATTY DAVIS, being duly sworn, says that she is em-
ployed by Wendell P. Abies, Attorney for Linda S. Cogan that she 
served the attached Amended Petition for Modification to Plain-
tiff Terry B. Cogan placing a true and correct copy thereof in 
envelopes addressed to: 
Terry B. Cogan 
c/o Deason, Peters, Stockton & Company 
Certified Public Accounts 
4 00 North Pennsylvania Avenue i 
Roswell, New Mexico 882 02-1517 , 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the £??4K day of October, 1988. 
Patty bavis 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^^Ht^day of 
<j€iptembei', 1988. 
Wn-i-v, g. 
My Commission Expires: 
n-iM-qj 
Notary Public 
Residing at ffil^VLake Cilyy^ /ftah 
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